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Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co.: 
DUTY TO CORRECT OR WARN 
OF CONDITIONS IN 
LONGSHOREMAN'S ACT 
In Hodges v. Evisea Maritime Co., 801 
F.2d 6781986), the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit has held that under 
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act (the "Act"), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 905(b) (1982), before a shipowner can be 
said to have a duty to correct or warn of a 
condition arising during cargo operations, 
the shipowner must be chargeable both 
with knowledge of the condition and with 
knowledge that despite the danger, the 
stevedore is continuing its operations. 
On July 26, 1977, the MIV Concordia 
Sky, owneq by Evisea, was engaged in 
cargo operations in Virginia when an un-
identified and semiconscious man was dis-
covered in the No.3 tween deck. The man, 
unable to communicate and initially mis-
taken for a stowaway, was eventually taken 
to a hospital. Several days later he was 
identified as Gary Hodges, a longshore-
man who had worked on the Concordia 
Sky during its loading in Baltimore on 
July 25th. 
An investigation was subsequently con-
ducted by Liberty Mutual, the compensa-
tion carrier for the stevedore employing 
Hodges, Robert C. Herd & Co. No eye-
witnesses to Hodges' injury were found. 
Hodges had suffered serious head injuries, 
leading him to claim a retrograde memory 
loss and an inability to recall anything im-
mediately prior to or following his apparent 
accident. Because Liberty Mutual could 
not satisfy its statutory burden to show 
that Hodges' injury was not work related, 
Hodges was awarded disability benefits 
paid by Liberty Mutual pursuant to the 
Act. 
Hodges subsequently sued Evisea and 
the charterer of the Concordia Sky, Con-
cordia Line, alleging that the ship's negli-
gence caused his injuries. Liberty Mutual 
intervened as a plaintiff to protect its inter-
est. A directed verdict was subsequently 
entered in favor of Concordia Line. 
Hodges' theory of negligence turned pri-
marily on his assertion that prior to his in-
juries he was working in the ship's No.2 
hold, that he returned to the previously 
loaded No. 3 hold to obtain additional 
dunnage, and fell through an open hatch 
on the No.3 upper tween deck. Hodges 
claimed that the vessel's owners were neg-
ligent both in leaving the hatch open and 
in failing to provide adequate lighting or 
other safety measures that would have pre-
vented the fall. 
The 1972 amendments to the Act elim-
inated the right oflongshoremen to recover 
from a shipowner for acts caused byunsea-
worthiness, and further limited the right 
to recover to those injuries caused by the 
shipowner's negligence. ld. at 683. Under 
the amendments, the determination of the 
applicable standard of negligence was left 
to the courts. 
In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. 
De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), the 
Supreme Court clarified the relative du-
ties of shipowners and stevedores, under 
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act. The Scindia Court con-
cluded: 
Section 905(b) of the LHWCA does 
not impose upon the shipowner a con-
tinuing duty to inspect the cargo oper-
ations once the stevedore has begun 
work. Rather, prior to the commence-
ment of stevedoring operations, the 
shipowner must "at least" exercise 
ordinary care under the circumstances 
to have the ship in such a condition 
that an experienced stevedore, with 
the exercise of reasonable care, can 
carry out its operations. The ship-
owner must warn the stevedore ofhaz-
ards that are or should be known to the 
vessel, if the hazards are not known or 
should be known to the stevedore. The 
vessel is also liable, after the stevedor-
ing work has begun, if it actively in-
volves itself in the cargo operations 
and its negligence causes an injury, or 
if it fails to exercise due care to in-
tervene to protect longshoremen from 
hazards under the active control of the 
vessel during the stevedoring opera-
tion. 
ld. at 166-168. 
The Hodges court determined that there 
was evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that under Scindia, the owner's 
or crew of the vessel had a duty to inter-
vene and exercise their control over the 
No.3 hold to eliminate the dangerous con-
ditions of the open hatch and poor lighting. 
The court also concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence of a breach of this duty 
by the vessel. 
Having held that the jury instructions 
relating to the allocation of duties of care 
with respect to dangerous conditions be-
tween the vessel and stevedore during on-
going stevedoring operations were inade-
quate under Scindia, the Hodges court 
found it necessary to reverse and remand 
the case for a new trial. The sole jury in-
struction given by the trial court address-
ing the relative duties of stevedores and 
shipowners once stevedoring operations are 
under way was the following: "It is not 
contended by the plaintiffs that the ship-
owner had a duty to superintend or oversee 
the operations of the stevedoring company 
or its employees, and the shipowner in fact 
had no such duty under the facts of this 
case." Hodges 801 F.2d at 686. The court 
stated that the evidence required a more 
detailed instruction delineating the limits, 
of the shipowner's duty to intervene dur-
ing cargo operations with respect to the 
dangers posed by the open hatch and unlit 
hold. 
Prior to the Hodges decision, the Fourth 
Circuit had yet to give effect to the 1972 
amendments to the Act. The Hodges court 
adopted the holding of the Supreme Court 
in Scindia with respect to the standard of 
negligence applicable to shipowners under 
the Act. 
This decision places a heavy burden on 
stevedores to avoid injuries caused by ob-
vious hazards. The high standard of care 
now placed on stevedores is apparent from 
the fact that the duty of shipowners exists 
only as a supplement to the duty of steve-
dores in supervising its longshoremen so 
that injuries will not result from obvious 
or warned of defects of the vessel. Thus, 
under the Longshore and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act., 33 U.S.C. § 905 
(1982), the duties of the shipowner are 
now limited, and the primary burden to 
avoid injuries is now placed upon the 
stevedore. 
- Jennifer Crump 
The May Dep't Stores Company 
v. Harryman: "BUSINESS 
PREMISES" UNDER WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION EXTENDED 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
May Dep't Stores Co. v. Harryman, 307 
Md. 692, 517 A.2d 71 (1986), has con-
cluded that an employee who was injured 
on an assigned parking lot, while she was 
proceeding directly to her workplace, is 
entitled to an award under the Workers' 
Compensation Act, Md. Ann. Code art. 
101, §§ 15 and 67(6), (the Act). The deci-
sion extends, under certain circumstances, 
to situations where the lot is not directly 
owned by the employer. 
The employee, Muriel Harryman, was 
employed by The May Department Stores 
Company, T/A The Hecht Company 
(Hecht's). The store in question was one of 
many tenants at a county mall, which is 
surrounded by a parking lot. On Novem-
ber 28, 1983, Ms. Harryman parked her 
car in the designated parking area, pur-
suant to a lease agreement between the em-
ployer and the owner of the lot. As she ap-
proached the mall entrance (about two car 
lengths from her vehicle), a person came 
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